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IS THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA BIASED IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES?
P.W . HOGG*
Toronto

I . The'Issue.

In recent public discussions of the Supreme Court of Canada the
allegation has occasionally surfaced that the court has been biased in
favour of the federal interest in constitutional cases .' The allegation
has been especially stimulated by the decisions in the two
broadcasting cases,' which denied provincial power over cable
television, and by the CIGOL3 and Potash 4 cases, which limited
provincial power to tax and regulate the production of natural
resources located in the province . It is true that over the last few
years there has been an increase in both the number and the
importance of the constitutional cases before the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the federal interest has fared much better than the
provincial interests
When a province loses a case which engages vital provincial
policies it is only to be expected that the province's politicians will
be upset with the result, and that their criticism will depart from the
conventions of polite legal discourse. But in my view the allegation
of bias has to be taken seriously by lawyers and political scientists . It
casts doubt upon the efficacy of judicial review as a means of
resolving federal-provincial controversies . It underlies the proposals
to entrench the court in the constitution and to provide a role for the
* P.W. Hogg, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
This article originated as a paperwhich I delivered to classes at the University of
Victoria and the University of British Columbia in January 1979 . 1 have also tried it
out on my own students and a number of my colleagues . It has been heard or read by a
large number of people, and I have benefited from many comments . I should
however specifically acknowledge the particularly helpful comments of law student
Douglas Marshall and law professors Stanley Schiff, William Angus and Katherine
Swinton.
1 Charges of bias in the press prompted a defence of the court by the Chief
Justice: Laskin, Judicial Integrity and the Supreme Court of Canada, [1978] Law
Soc. Gaz. 116.
s Capital Cities Communications v . Canadian Radio-Television Commission,

[197812 S.C .R . 141; Public Service Board v . Dionne, [1978] 2 S.C .R . 191 ; but
compare A.-G. Que . v . Kellogg's Co . of Canada, [1978] 2 S.C .R . 211 .
'Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil v . Govt. of Sask ., [1978] 2 S .C .R . 545,
hereinafter referred to as CIGOL .
' Central Canada Potash Co . v . Govt . of Sask ., [1979] 1 S.C .R . 42 .
s See K. Lysyk, Reshaping Canadian Federalism (1979), 13 U.B .C .L . Rev . 1,
at pp . 16-21, who does not, however, allege bias .
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provinces in selecting the judges . The purpose of this article is to
examine the allegation of bias on its merits .s
We must start with the trite proposition that the law rarely
supplies a clear answer to the questions which come before the
Supreme Court of Canada . A litigant is not likely to spend good
money taking an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada unless he is
convinced that there is a fair chance that the Supreme Court will
reverse the decision which was arrived at by the provincial (or
federal) court of appeal . The Supreme Court is not likely to give
leave to appeal if a simple point of law is involved. The fact is that
the Supreme Court often does reverse the court of appeal, and is
often divided itself . All of the constitutional controversies which
come before the court are cases where the language of the
constitution does not speak clearly with respect to the question at
hand, and the precedents either do not quite cover the question at
hand or are conflicting . Obviously, differences of opinion as to the
"correct" result in such cases do not imply bias on the part of
anyone .

There is a longstanding controversy among legal scholars as to
how judges do decide these difficult cases where a judge has to
choose between competing interpretations of the existing legal
materials . The extreme "positivist" point of view that a judge
simply applies the pre-existing rules to the case at hand is entirely
unhelpful, because it is the ambiguous or vague condition of the
pre-existing rules which has caused the litigation, and the judge's
decision will itself define for the first time the rule which is
applicable to the case at hand (and like cases) . In this situation a new
rule has been created (or developed or elaborated) . In formulating
that new rule the judge exercises a choice which cannot be wholly
explained by the pre-exising rules . How is that choice made? The
extreme "realist" point of view would be that judges are inevitably
free to indulge their own personal policy preferences in choosing
between competing interpretations of the pre-existing rules. But it
seems clear that judges do not feel that they have this kind of
freedom, and the shared assumption of appellate advocacy is that the
judge is not free to develop the law along lines which would be
congenial to his own preferences. The moderate position, which
seems to me to be accurate, is that the judicial choice is primarily
governed by the body of legal policies and principles which underlie
s Thew is
an important study in existence, commissioned by the government of
Quebec, Gilbert L'Ecuyer, La Cour suprême du Canada et le partage des
compétences 1949-1978 (Gouvernement du Québec, Ministère des Affaires inter
gouvernementales, 1978), which rejects the allegation of bias . The present article,
while agreeing with L'Ecuyer's conclusion, investigates the issue by different
methods.
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the more specific rules and which emerge from the statutes, cases
and other conventional sources of law; thejudge formulates the legal
rule which seems to him to flow most plausibly from those
conventional sources of law, even if the result does not accord with
his own policy preferences .7 But it is undeniable that the decision of
a difficult case may, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said long ago,
"depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major premise" ;' and precisely because that crucial judgment or
intuition is inarticulate, it can be influenced-unconsciously no
doubt-by the judge's predispositions.'

I conclude that it is at least possible for a judge to be biased in
federal-provincial controversies . Of course, the Supreme Court of
Canada consists of nine judges at any one point of time, and a total of
fifty-seven judges have sat on the court., In investigating the charge
of bias in federal-provincial controversies it is necessary to ask
whether the numerous judges of the court are likely to share a
predisposition to favour the federal or centralist side of the case .

II. Federal Appointment ofJudges.
The simplest form of the argument for bias is that the judges are
appointed and paid by the federal government, and will feel
beholden to the federal government . Sometimes this argument is
reinforced by the argument that the institution itself-the Supreme
Court of Canada-was created by a federal statute, and could be
abolished the same way. These facts, it would be said, may serve to
inculcate gratitude or fear (or a mixture of the two) in the minds of
the Supreme Court judges, predisposing them to render decisions
pleasing to the federal government . It is obviously not necessary to
embark on a detailed rebuttal of this argument . The fact is that once a
judge has been appointed-admittedly by the federal governmenthe has nothing to hope for or fear from the federal government .
Constitutional guarantees and powerful political traditions of judicial
independence render the judge invulnerable to any kind of governmental action . t o
' Out of the vast literature on judicial .decision-making, I cite as particularly
useful on this point, Paul C. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making
(1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406; Paul C. Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial
Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev . 1 .
a Lochner v . New York (1905), 198 U.S . 45, at p. 76, per Holmes J . dissenting ;
see also The Path of the Law (1897), 10 Harv . L . Rev. 457, at p. 466.
s In Lochner v . New York, ibid ., it will be recalled that the Supreme Court of the
United States struck down a state law prescribing maximum hours of labour in
bakeries as "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference" with freedom
of contract .
io The federal Parliament retains power.over judicial salaries, and the Prime
Minister decides who will be promoted to Chief Justice when that office is vacant .
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The objective fact of judicial independence would not preclude
the existence of a sycophantic psychology on the part of the judges .
The fact here, however, is that the judges are all longstanding
members of the legal profession ; in most cases they have been
engaged in the private practice of law; they have all been nurtured in
a professional tradition which is highly unsympathetic to governmental authority especially when exercised from Ottawa; and
they are unlikely to have developed attitudes which are unduly
deferential to the federal government . The strong likelihood is that
they value the assessment of their work by the legal profession
infinitely more highly than they value the opinions of the members of
the federal cabinet and civil service. The reputation of a judge in the
legal profession is established partly through scholarly writing but
mainly through informal discussion among lawyers, and it develops
primarily as a result of professional assessment of craftsmanship and
fairness . The judge who could always be counted on to vote for the
federal government would be regarded with contempt by the
profession.
A more subtle form of the bias argument holds that the federal
government exercises its appointing power in favour of people with
known centralist predispositions. It is only to be expected, so the
argument runs, that a government intent on strengthening its power
would make such appointments . In fact, however, it seems unlikely
that the government does engage in this kind of court-packing . It is
not easy to find eminent lawyers and judges who are in favour of
increased centralization of power in Ottawa . If obvious candidates
for appointment were being passed over in favour of committed
centralists, or if enquiries were being made about the constitutional
opinions of potential candidates, I think it is obvious that these facts
would become known and would be the subject of a considerable
protest. 11
To be sure, there are well-qualified candidates who have
publicly recorded their views on some aspects of federal-provincial
relationships . It is well known that Chief Justice Laskin, as a law
professor, was a vigorous critic of the Privy Council decisions which
strengthened provincial power at the expense of the federal
government . 12 It is less well known that Mr. Justice Pigeon and Mr.
But the tradition of judicial independence ensures that these powers will not be used
to punish or reward judges who render decisions adverse to or favourable to the
federal government .
11
For an account of the procedure which is followed in making judicial
appointments, see E . Ratushny, Judicial Appointments : The Lang Legacy, in A .M .
Linden (ed .), The Canadian Judiciary (1976), ch . 2 .
12 B . Laskin, Peace, Order and Good Government Re-examined (1947), 25 Can .
Bar Rev . 1054.
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Justice Beetz before their appointments had published articles which
vigorously defended the decisions of the Privy Council. 13 So far as I
am aware, none of the other judges had before appointment recorded
his opinions on constitutional law." On the basis of the precedents
of Laskin C.J ., Pigeon and Beetz JJ ., it is impossible to substantiate
any charge of court-packing . In any case it is impossible to predict
with confidence how a person will vote when he assumes judicial
office . For example, Laskin C.J . has written the court's opinion, or a
separate concurring opinion, in every case in which a federal statute
has been held unconstitutional ;" Pigeon and Beetz JJ . have often
written or agreed to opinions holding a provincial statute to be
unconstitutional . is

It must be remembered too that constitutional cases form only a
very small part of the work of the Supreme Court of Canada . The
great majority of cases are appeals in civil or criminal cases which
involve no constitutional issues at all . One of the factors which is
taken into account by the federal government in making appointments is the securing of an appropriate mix of legal experience and
expertise among the judges . It would be impossible for the federal
government to give due weight to this consideration, as well as
conforming to the conventional regional balance of the judges," at
the same time as it was pursuing judges who could be relied upon to
vote the "right" way in constitutional cases.
The truth is, I suspect, that the federal government does not see
the winning of constitutional law cases as a major policy objective,
13 L.-P . Pigeon, The
Meaning of Provincial Autonomy (1951), 29 Can. Bar
Rev. 1126 ; J. Beetz, Les attitudes changeantes du Quebec à l'endroit de la
Constitution de 1867, in P.-A . Cr6peau and C.B . Macpherson, The Future of
Canadian Federalism (1965), p. 113.
14 Judges, appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada from the bench of another
court would normally have decided the occasional constitutional case .

15
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada, [197712 S.C .R . 134; McNamara Construction
v. The Queen, [197712 S.C .R . 655; Quebec North Shore Paper Co . v. Canadian
Pacific, [1977) 2 S .C .R . 1054 ; Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act,
[197812 S.C .R . 1198 .
"E .g ., Amax Potash v. Govt. of Sask ., [19771 2 S.C.R . 576; Canadian

Industrial Gas and Oil v. Govt . of Sask ., supra, footnote 3; A.-G. Que. v. Farrah,
[197812 S.C .R . 638.
17 The
Supreme Court Act, R.S .C ., 1970, c. S-19, s. 6, stipulates that three of
the nine judges must come from Quebec. Until December 1978 the practice was to
appoint three judges from Ontario, two from the four Western provinces, and one
from the Atlantic provinces. In December 1978, on the retirement of Spence J. who
had been appointed from Ontario, McIntyre J. was appointed from British Columbia .
The present composition of the court therefore includes (as well as the three judges
from Quebec and the one from the Atlantic provinces) two judges from Ontario, two
judges from the prairie provinces and one judge from British Columbia . It remains to
be seen whether this is now to be the permanent regional distribution of
appointments .
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does not see the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional cases as
being of major importance in determining the balance of power
between the centre and the provinces," and does see that any
evidence of packing the court would provoke a storm of protest. If
these viewpoints correspond with reality, as I believe they do, then
one must conclude that it is good politics to make good appointments .
III . Frequent Invalidation of Provincial Statutes.
The only remaining argument for bias is based on the outcomes of
constitutional casesl 9 decided in the Supreme Court of Canada from
the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council on December 23rd,
1949, to the present ." I have looked at all those cases, and I find that
is The federal-provincial financial arrangements, which are made by agreement
between the eleven governments, and which encompass the sharing of tax "room",
equalization grants and shared-cost programmes, are incomparably more significant .
When a judicial decision does have a serious impact on the federal-provincial sharing
of power, an accommodation is usually reached by agreement among the various
governments . On three occasions that agreement has led to a constitutional
amendment to reverse the effect of ajudicial decision : s. 91(2A) of the British North
America Act (added by British North America Act, 1940, 3-4 Geo. VI, c. 36 (U .K .))
and s. 94A (added by British North America Act, 1951, 14-15 Geo. VI, c . 32 (U .K .)
and revised by British North America Act, 1964, 12-13 Eliz . 11, c. 73 (U .K .)),
hereinafter referred to as B.N .A . Act, were designed to abrogateA .-G. Can v. A .-G.
Ont (Unemployment Insurance), [1937] A.C . 355 . More commonly, the effect of the
decision can be overcome or modified by revenue-sharing arrangements (e .g .,
modifying effect ofReference re Offshore Mineral Rights, [1967] S .C .R . 792) or by
federal inter-delegations of various kinds (e .g ., those upheld in Lord's Day Alliance
v. A .-G. B .C ., [1959] S.C .R . 497; P.E .I . Potato Marketing Board v. Willis, [1952]
2 S .C .R . 392; Coughlin v. Ont. Highway Transport Board, [1968] S.C .R . 569;
Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra, footnote 15, each of which
was a response to a judicial decision). I predict that current controversies over the
control and taxation of natural resources and over cable television will also be settled
reasonably agreeably to the contending governments. Indeed, one scholar has argued
that judicial review could be abolished in view of the existence of consensual
methods of resolving federal-provincial controversies: Paul C. Weiler, The Supreme
Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J . 225: Paul C.
Weiler, In the Last Resort (1974), ch . 6 .
is 1 included only cases which raised a constitutional issue of federalism .
Constitutional cases on points not bearing on the distribution of powers were
excluded, for example, cases on the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S .C ., 1970, Appendix
III. I excluded cases in which the majority opinion was not based on a constitutional
issue, even though the point may have been strenously argued, or even formed the
basis of a dissenting opinion (as in Breckinridge Speedway v . The Queen, [1970]
S.C .R . 1975). I also excluded cases in which a constitutional point was referred to in
the majority opinion, but was in my view either an obiter dictum or a subsidiary
ground of decision; these exclusions are more controversial, but it must be
appreciated that the constitution is argued in many cases and often receives passing
reference in the decisions, for example, in administrative law cases .
a° The cases comprise all the decisions of which I was aware, from the beginning
of 1950 up to June 1st, 1979 . This included all the cases reported in the Supreme
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sixty-five provincial statutes were attacked in the Supreme Court of
Canada and twenty-five of them were held to be unconstitutional in
whole or in part," or to be inoperative through paramountcy . In the
same period thirty-seven federal statutes were attacked in the
Supreme Court of Canada and four of them were held to be
unconstitutional in whole or in part .
This kind of raw data must be treated with the utmost caution.
Consider some of the complicating factors .
First of all, there are ten legislative bodies busy enacting
provincial laws and only one legislative body enacting federal laws .
Even allowing for the fact that many provincial statutes duplicate
those of other provinces, the volume and variety of provincial laws
are so much greater that there are bound to be, and there are, more
challenges to the constitutionality of provincial laws . In the period of
my study, January 1950 to lay .1979 inclusive, as I have just
indicated above, there were sixty-five decisions on the validity of
provincial laws, and thirty-seven decisions on the validity of federal
laws . Of course, this point goes to explain the number of challenges
to provincial laws,, not the ratio of success to failure.
Secondly, in such a large and diverse country as Canada, the .
provinces really are the "social laboratories" that they are supposed
to be . Innovative and even radical political ideas tend to find
political expression at the provincial level . Federal governments, by
contrast, cannot get elected except on middle-of-the-road policies
which appeal to a broad cross-section of the country. Since the
second world war cautious or weak federal governments have
undertaken few initiatives which would invite a plausible constitutional challenge . The Trudeau . government was quite exceptional in
its willingness to intervene in the economy. The provinces, however,
especially in the west and in Quebec, frequently elect governments
with strong mandates to intervene in the economy. These interventions naturally provoke constitutional challenges .
Thirdly, technological developments have tended to diminish
provincial powers of economic regulation and increase federal
Court Reports up to Part 2 of [1979] 1 S.C .R . together with four cases decided, but
unreported in S .C .R . at that time, namely, Construction Montcalm v. Commission du
salaire minimum, December 21st, 1978 ; Tropwood A.G . v . Sivaco Wire and Nail
Co ., March 6th, 1979 ; Mississauga v . Peel, March 6th, 1979 ; The Queen v. Hauser,
May 1st, 1979 . I excluded Winner v . S.M.T. Eastern, [1951] S.C .R . 887 because,
although it was decided after 1949, it still went on appeal up to the Privy Council.
" In
six cases a statute was not held invalid, but "read down" or interpreted
narrowly so that it was held inapplicable to the facts on the ground that a literal
application of the statute would have been unconstitutional . On reading down, see
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), pp . 90-92. 1 counted these cases as
holdings of partial invalidity .
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powers . 22 Even in 1867 shipping and rail could move products from
their producers to distant markets ; but those means of transportation
have now been joined by the highways and the airlines . Similarly,
the printing press has now been joined by the motion picture, the
telephone, radio and television . The improvements in transportation
and communication, and other technological developments, have led
to larger and larger business units which can take advantage of the
techniques of mass production, mass distribution and mass advertising . This has led to the gradual disappearance of locally-produced
consumer goods . The general tendency of technological change is to
convert activities which were once local and private, and which
could be governed by the private law of contract, tort, and property,
into activities which extend across the entire nation, make use of
public facilities and require regulation in order to protect the public
from predatory or monopolistic practices . These developments do
not necessarily answer the question of which level of government
should be the regulator . But in many instances the need for a single
national policy is so clear that the federal claim is very plausible .
Fourthly, in a federal system-any federal system-provincial
laws are vulnerable to constitutional challenge on the basis of their
extraterritorial impact . Various doctrines are either expressed in the
constitution or are inferred by the courts to limit the power of a
provincial legislature, which is elected by and answerable to the
people of only that province, to enact policies which will have an
impact on the people of other provinces . This is the underlying
policy behind many of the limits on the powers of the provinces,
even though the limits may be expressed in terms of encroaching on
interprovincial trade and commerce, imposing indirect taxation, as
well as the mor-- straightforward prohibition on extraterritorial laws .
The federal Parliament, by contrast, is elected from all over the
country . No doctrine has developed and none is needed to prevent it
from overreaching in a territorial sense. 23
82 Paralleling technological developments has been the rise of egalitarian values
reflected in social policies to provide income support and security from illness,
disability and old age . Many of these policies are within provincial legislative
jurisdiction, but there is also a heavy federal presence reflected in federal
programmes of unemployment insurance, family allowances, Canada pension plan,
old age security, guaranteed income supplement, and in shared-cost programmes of
income support, hospital insurance and medical care . Unlike economic regulation,
programmes of income distribution and social security rely primarily upon extensive
spending powers and are rarely vulnerable to constitutional challenge .
23 It may be objected that the federal Parliament is subject to a comparable
limitation in the sense that it is precluded from legislating in relation to matters which
are local . Perhaps the answer is that this fourth point is really only a corollary to the
third point, which is that fewer and fewer matters are genuinely local .
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Fifthly, in Canada, and apparently in all modern federations,"
provincial laws are vulnerable to constitutional challenge on the
basis of their inconsistency with federal law. This is a judge-made
doctrine in Canada, to be sure, but one for which the Privy Council,
and not the Supreme Court of Canada, bears the responsibility . In
any event, I think there would be little quarrel with the general
proposition that where national and provincial laws come into
conflict it is the national law-the law with the broadest political
supportwhich should prevail." The doctrine of federal
paramountcy provides a ground for challenging provincial laws
which is not available in respect of federal laws ."

What all this means is that we must expect many more
successful constitutional challenges to provincial laws than federal
laws . This situation stems from the nature of the Canadian federal
system, not from any bias on the part of the judges . Even during the
Privy Council period this was true . I only have figures from 1919 to
the end of appeals, but that was the period when the Privy Council
established doctrines highly favourable to the provinces. In that
period there were thirty-five challenges to provincial statutes of
which nineteen were. held invalid in whole or in part, and twenty-two
challenges to federal statutes of which eight were held invalid in
whole or in part .27 The Privy Council was less restrained in judicial
review than the Supreme Court of Canada . Therefore the rate of
invalidation is higher for both classes of statutes . But a similar
discrepancy in the numbers of challenges and in the proportions of
successful challenges is obvious.

IV . Doctrines Established by the Court.
1 . Legacy of the Privy Council .

Let us now move away from the raw data and ask whether the
doctrines established by the judges indicate a pro-centralist bias .
The legacy left by the Privy Council was a very broad provincial
power over property and civil rights in the province, and correspondingly narrow federal powers over the peace, order, and good
government of Canada and over the regulation of . trade and
K.C . Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed., 1963), p. 74 .
The practice of other federal systems, see Wheare, op . cit., ibid., supports
this proposition. This is not to deny that in a revised Canadian constitution there may
well be some areas of concurrent legislative power where the general rule should be
reversed so that provincial laws would be paramount.
Zs
In the period under study, 1950-1979, supra, footnote 20, only two provincial
statutes were actually held inoperative by reason of federal paramountcy . The
paramountcy cases are discussed later in this article .
2'
25

27

Paul C. Weiler, In the Last-Resort (1974), p. 309, note 3 .

730

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[VOL . LVII

commerce . As new kinds of legislation emerged, even when the
initiative had come from the federal Parliament, the Privy Council
had often allotted the new law to provincial jurisdiction, usually,
property and civil rights in the province . The regulation of
insurance, and therefore of other industries and occupations, most
labour relations, trades and professions, wages and prices, combinations, health and welfare, and the marketing of natural products were
all topics which the Privy Council ruled were outside the competence
of the federal Parliament, except in time of war. During the
depression of the 1930's the federal Parliament did not have the
power to undertake measures designed to alleviate the distress and
prevent its recurrence. Federal laws providing for unemployment
insurance, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, as well as
marketing regulation, were all held to be unconstitutional ."'
The decisions of the Privy Council were widely if not
universally deplored by English-Canadian constitutional lawyers,
although not by French-Canadian constitutional lawyers .29 From a
doctrinal point of view, however, there was surely force in the
criticism that the decisions had virtually emptied the major federal
powers of content . It was not a particularly plausible interpretation
of the peace, order, and good government power that it applied only
in wartime . It was not a particularly plausible interpretation of the
trade and commerce power that it would not permit the regulation of
any intraprovincial trade and commerce . Indeed, the Privy Council
itself had left a number of decisions and dicta which reflected quite
different opinions than those which became dominant during the
Haldane period.
2. Peace, Order, and Good Government .
When we look at the extensions of the peace, order and good
government power which have occurred since 1949, we have to
remember how severely that power had been attenuated by the Privy
Council and how inevitable it was that there would be a movement
away from the Privy Council's more extreme views. In fact, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have been quite cautious
in departing from Privy Council precedents. The "national concern"
branch of peace, order, and good government has been used to
uphold federal power over aviation ,3° the national capital commission ,31 the minerals off the shore of British Columbia" and the
zs See generally, Peter W . Hogg, op . cit ., footnote 21, chs 14, 15, 17 .
zs Compare the articles cited, supra, footnotes 12 and 13 ; and see Alan C .
Cairns, The Judicial Committee and its Critics (1971), 4 Can . J. Pol . Sci . 301 .
ao Johannesson v . West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S .C .R . 292 .
a' Munro v . National Capital Commission, [1966] S .C .R . 663 .
Referenc e re Offshore Mineral Rights, supra, footnote 18 .
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control of narcotics .33 None of these outcomes would surprise a
visitor from another federation . But in the Anti-Inflation Reference
(1976),34 a case which shows up in the raw data as a federal victory,
the Supreme Court of Canada refused to extend the national concern
test to wage and price controls . These could only be enacted as a
temporary emergency measure in wartime or in a peacetime crisis .
To be sure, the court found that the requisite crisis existed, and
upheld the Anti-Inflation Act; but the court emphasized that
permanent controls were outside federal competence . I suggest that a
visitor from another federation would be surprised that permanent
wage and price controls cannot be enacted by the federal Parliament .
This means, of course, that they cannot be enacted at all, because
provincial controls could not be effective while there is free
movement across provincial boundaries of personnel, capital, goods
and services . The opinions in the Anti-Inflation Reference, and
especially that of Beetz J ., abundantly demonstrate the continuing
life of the Privy Council extensions of property and civitrights in . the
province .
3 . .Trade and Commerce .
The history of the trade and commerce power is similar. Pew
people would quarrel with the Supreme Court of Canada's acceptance of federal marketing legislation for wheat35 and oil, 38 products
which flow across provincial boundaries .37 But when the federal
government sought to use the trade and commerce power to uphold a
law which afforded a civil remedy for loss caused by an act or
business practice which was "contrary to honest industrial or
commercial practice in Canada" the Supreme Court of Canada in
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada (1976) '38 unanimously condemned the
law. Once again,ithe viability of the old cases on property and civil
rights in the province was reaffirmed . In theAnti-Inflation Reference
(1976) '39 counsel for the federal government did not even argue that
33
The Queen v . Hauser, supra, footnote 20 . This is a surprising decision,
because it appears to resuscitate Russell v . The Queen (1882), 7 App . Cas . 829, a
decision widely regarded as wrong, and because narcotics law had hitherto been
generally regarded as criminal . But the allocation of narcotics law to federal power is
not at all surprising .
34 (197612 S .C .R . 373 .
3s Murphy v . Canadian Pacific Railway, [19581 S .C .R . 626 .
36 Caloil v . A .-G . Can ., [19711 S .C .R. 543 .
37 See also Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra, footnote
15, where an egg marketing scheme was upheld . The scheme was the fruit of a
federal-provincial agreement and supported by both federal and provincial statutes;
the federal statute was carefully expressed in most of its provisions to be limited to
interprovincial and export trade.
38
Supra, footnote 38 .
39
Supra, footnote 34 .
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the trade and commerce power could sustain the wage and price
controls, and the tenor of the opinions makes clear that at least five
of the nine judges would have emphatically rejected such an
argument .
The Supreme Court of Canada has used an expanded view of the
trade and commerce power to strike down several provincial
marketing schemes, including Manitoba's egg marketing scheme4°
and Saskatchewan's scheme to control the production and price of
potash .41 The essential basis of these decisions is that the provincial
law had too severe an impact on interprovincial trade and commerce .
In my opinion, these decisions are hard to reconcile with earlier
decisions and therefore do represent a shift in doctrine by the
Supreme Court of Canada; 42 it is a shift which is unfavourable to
provincial power. But, as I noted earlier, every federal system has to
define limits on the power of its provincial (or state) governments to
affect people in other parts of the country. The litigation which this
same issue has spawned in the United StateS 43 and Australia44
demonstrates that this is a real problem upon which people of equal
intelligence and equal good faith are simply not going to agree.
Moreover, while the provinces have lost some of the cases where the
effects of provincial laws have rippled outside the province, they
have won others, most notably, Carnation Co . v Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board (1968),'5 in which a provincial marketing
scheme was held applicable to a processor of milk who shipped the
bulk of the processed product out of the province ,46 and Canadian
Indemnity Co . v. A .-G . B.C . (1976), 4? in which the creation of a
provincial monopoly of automobile insurance was upheld despite the
interprovincial character of the business of writing automobile
insurance . The latter case reaffirmed the Privy Council precedents
upholding provincial jurisdiction over the insurance industry . In the
United States, by contrast, initial holdings of state jurisdiction over
insurance were reversed in 1944 on the basis that the nation-wide
4° A .-G . Man . v . Man . Eg g and Poultry Assn ., [1971] S .C .R . 689; see also
Burns Foods v . A .-G . Man . [1975] 1 S .C .R . 494 .
43 Central Canada Potash Co . v . Govt . of Sask., supra, footnote 4 ; see also
Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil v . Govt. of Sask ., supra, footnote 3 .
42 Peter W . Hogg, op . cit ., footnote 21, p . 311 .
43 Laurence H . Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978), ch . 6.
44 P .H . Lane, The Australian Federal System (1972), pp . 597-675 .
45 [19681 S .C .R . 238,
48 See also Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra, footnote
15, where provincial controls on the production of eggs were upheld, although the
controls applied regardless of the ultimate destination of the eggs .
47 [197712 S .C.R . 504 .
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character of the industry brought it within the commerce clause and
thus within federal jurisdiction ."

One must conclude that while the federal trade and commerce
power has expanded at the hands of the Supreme Court of Canada, it
has not expanded very much . As a support to federal jurisdiction the
expansion has been very cautious, confined to marketing schemes
over wheat and oil and (with co-operative provincial supplementation) eggs . An observer from the United States would be astonished
to learn that the trade and commerce power cannot be employed to
regulate the insurance industry, or to impose nation-wide wage and
price controls, and that the constitutional validity of federal
regulation of foreign ownership, anti-trust and securities regulation
are still matters of argument among constitutional lawyers. As a
barrier to provincial jurisdiction, the, trade and commerce power has
been applied more boldly-to the chagrin of some of the provinces.
Even here, however, the results have not been uniformly unfavourable to provincial power to regulate activity which spills outside
provincial borders; and the difficulty of drawing the line between
that which is predominantly local, and that which is predominantly
interprovincial, is one which simply cannot be denied .
4. Cable Television .
The recent decisions affirming federal regulatory authority, over
cable television49 and denying provincial authority over cable
television" came as a blow to Quebec where - the issues were
perceived in terms of the protection of French-Canadian language
and culture. However, federal jurisdiction over broadcast (noncable) radio and television had been established by the Privy Council
in the Radio Reference (1930), 51 and the argument over cable
television boiled down to the question whether it was feasible to
regard the cable system as a local undertaking separate from the
undeniably federal broadcasting system . The Supreme Court's
decision that the cable system should not be regarded as separate was
in accord with a virtually unanimous accumulation of prior decisions
and published articles ." The point was still open, as is evidenced by
the dissents of the three French-Canadian judges, but it should be
noted that the Federal Court of Appeal in the Capital Cities case and
48 United States v . South-Eastern Underwriters Assn . (1944), 322 U.S . 533 .
4s Capital Cities Communications v . Canadian Radio-Television Commission,
supra, footnote 2 .
11 public Service Board v . Dionne, supra, footnote 2 ; but compare A .-G . Que .
v . Kellogg's Co . of Canada, supra, footnote 2 .
5' [19321 A .C . 304 . .
s2 The case-law and commentary before Capital Cities and Dionne are discussed
in Peter W . Hogg, op . cit ., footnote 21, pp . 336-342 .
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(more significantly, perhaps) the Quebec Court of Appeal in the
Dionne case was each unanimously of the same opinion as the
majority in the Supreme Court of Canada .
My opinion, for what it is worth, is that the competing federal
and provincial claims to regulate cable television are each founded
on real interests . A judicial decision which allocates jurisdiction to
one level of the government or the other cannot be entirely
satisfactory, whichever level of government emerges as the winner .
It is most unlikely that the judicial resolution will turn out to be final .
What is required is an agreement for the sharing of jurisdiction,
either spelled out in a revised constitution, or embodied in
sub-constitutional arrangements .
5 . Taxation .
In Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil v. Government of Saskatchewan (1977) '53 the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
provincial tax on oil produced in the province. The tax was designed
to appropriate to the province the dramatic increase in the price of oil
which had started in 1973 . Because of the huge sums involved the
decision was a serious blow to the province of Saskatchewan, and it
attracted severe criticism from the government of that province . The
legal issue before the court was whether the tax was direct or
indirect, because the provinces are confined to direct taxes by
section 92(2) of the B .N.A. Act. Previou s decisions established that
a tax which tended to enter into the price of a commodity was an
indirect tax and was incompetent to the provinces . The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that this tax was direct because the price of
oil determined the tax rather than the other way around . This was
also the view of Dickson J. (with de Grandpré J .) dissenting in the
Supreme Court of Canada . But Martland J . for the seven-judge
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada viewed the facts
differently, emphasizing the power which the statute conferred on
the provincial minister to fix the price at which oil was to be sold
when the minister was of opinion that oil had been sold at less than
fair value .
CIGOL must be accounted an important loss to the provinces in
federal-provincial litigation. I find the majority opinion of Martland
J . much less persuasive than the minority opinion of Dickson J . I do
not see the answer to Dickson J .'s point that "purchasers would be
paying the same price whether the tax existed or not" ." The
ministerial power to fix the price, which was relied upon. by
"

Supra, footnote 3. See also Amax Potash v. Govt . of Sask . supra, footnote

" Ibid., at p . 593 .
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Martland J., seems to me to be satisfactorily explained by Dickson J.
as a subsidiary provision to block evasion of the tax by "such
practices as sale of oil between related companies at artificially low
prices" . 55 However, the legal issue turned on one's perception of
exactly how the tax and associated regulations would impinge on the
,price of Saskatchewan oil. Differences of opinion on complex issues
of this kind should not lay the judges open to a charge of bias .

The Supreme Court of Canada recently made another decision
upon the provincial taxing power. In the Ontario Egg Reference
(1977), 11 the court held that marketing levies were not indirect taxes;
the levies were regulatory charges which could be imposed by the
provinces as an incident of a valid provincial marketing scheme .
This holding involved an unprecedented overruling of the decision of
the Privy Council in the Crystal Dairy case ,57 which had decided that
marketing levies were indirect taxes which were incompetent to the
provinces. It was also necessary to overrule (on this point) a previous
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Farm Products
Marketing Act Reference (1957) .,58 The court applied the new
doctrine by striking down a federal statute authorizing the imposition
of marketing levies by provincial marketing boards, notwithstanding
the fact that .the federal statute had been enacted in 1957 in reliance
on the fact that the Crystal Dairy doctrine had been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Farm Products Marketing Act
.Reference in 1957 . This unanimous holding, is a remarkable example
of judicial activism, and of . course its effect was to augment
provincial power.
6. Administration of Justice .

)Federal power over the administration of justice by federal
courts, which is granted by section 101 of the B .N .A . Act, has been
severely limited by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Quebec North Shore (1976) 59 and McNamara Construction (1977), 60
which hold that the federal Parliament can confer jurisdiction on
federal courts only over issues governed by federal statute law. This
has gravely undermined or rendered uncertain much of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada, introduced terrible complexities
to multi-party litigation, especially where the federal Crown (which
ss
ss
s'
Dairy,

Ibid., at p . 592 .
Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, supra, footnote 15 .
Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v . Crystal
[1933] A .C. 168 .
5e
[19571 S .C.R . 198 .
ss Quebec North Shore Paper Co . v . Canadian Pacific, supra, footnote 15 .
60 McNamara Construction v . The Queen, supra, footnote 15 .
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can only be sued in the Federal Court) is involved, and spawned a
flood of litigation which is now working its way up through the
system . 6l I have criticized these decisions elsewhere . 62 For present
purposes it suffices to note that the new doctrine is highly
unfavourable to federal power .
Provincial power over the administration of justice in the
province has been contentious in recent years . In Di Iorio v.
Montreal Jail Warden (1976), 63 the Supreme Court of Canada
decided by a majority that the province of Quebec had the
jurisdiction to establish an inquiry into organized crime, despite the
close relationship with the federal subject of criminal law. However,
in the Keable case 64 the court decided unanimously that the province
of Quebec did not have the jurisdiction to establish a broad-ranging
inquiry into the policies, procedures and methods of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, although the inquiry could be continued
in respect of particular criminal acts allegedly committed in Quebec
by the force. In The Queen v. Hauser (1979), 65 the court decided by
a majority that the federal Parliament had the jurisdiction to provide
for the federal prosecution of offences under the Narcotic Control
Act. This decision, like Keable, was unfavourable to the provincial
point of view, but, also like Keable, it was based on rather narrow
grounds . The court in Hauser did not affirm federal power to provide
for the prosecution of criminal law (as many observers expected) ; a
majority of the court managed to avoid this vexed issue by holding
that the Narcotic Control Act was not really a criminal law after all,66
which enabled the court to decide the case on the basis that the
federal Parliament had the power to provide for the enforcement of
its non-criminal laws .
Frequent attacks on provincial administrative agencies (or
inferior courts), based on the allegation that the agencies (or courts)
were exercising judicial powers analogous to those of a superior
court in contravention of section 96 and the other judicature
provisions of the B .N .A . Act, have met with success in three
cases," but have usually failed. The court has emphasized that "it is
si At the time of writing only one case had reached the Supreme Court of
Canada, namely, Tropwood A .G . v. Sivaco Wire and Nail Co ., supra, footnote 20,
upholding federal jurisdiction in admiralty .
sz Comment (1977), 55 Can . Bar Rev . 550.
sa [19781 1 S .C .R . 152 .
s4
A .-G. Que . and Keable . v . A .-G . Can ., [1979] 1 S .C .R . 218 .
ss Supra, footnote 20 .
ss . Supra, footnote 33 .
s' Toronto v . Olympia Edward Recreation Club, [1955] S .C .R . 454 ; Seminary
of Chicoutimi v . A .-G . Que . . [19731 S .C .R . 681 ; A .-G . Que . v . Farrah, supra,
footnote 16 .
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not the detached jurisdiction or power alone that is to be considered
but rather its setting in the institutional arrangements in which it
appears and is exercisable under the provincial legislation" . 61, This
pragmatic contextual approach is of course favourable to the
provincial power to set up administrative agencies .
7 . Civil Liberties.
In the 1950s the Supreme Court of Canada rendered decisions
which , tended to limit if not deny provincial power to legislate in
relation to speech and religion . The Saumur case (1953)" held that
the City of Quebec could not prevent the distribution of religious
tracts in the streets . Switzman v. _Elbling (1957)'° held that a
provincial law prohibiting the use of a house to propagate
communism was invalid . These cases were unfavourable to provincial power, to be sure, but they had their roots in well-respected dicta
by Duff C .J . and Cannon J. in the Alberta Press case (1938),' 1 and
they were widely applauded for their support of civil libertarian
values . Recently, however, the court has upheld provincial restraints
on civil liberties . In Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil
(1978),'2 provincial censorship of movies was upheld as being
merely the regulation of a business (the movie business) and of
property (films) in the province ; and this despite the absence of any
explicit criteria laid down by the statute or regulation or by the
censorship board itself to limit the kinds of movies which could be
forbidden. In A .-G . Can. and Dupond v . Montreal (1978),'3 a
Montreal by-law prohibiting all demonstrations in the streets and
parks of the city for a specified period of time was upheld as a
regulation of the use of the municipal public domain .
It is difficult to believe that McNeil and Dupond would have
been decided the same way by the Supreme Court of the 1950 s . For
present purposes, the point is, of course, that the value of provincial
autonomy over local matters has been held to encompass even speech
and assembly despite the nation-wide implications of speech and
ss Tomko v. Labour Relations Bd. -(N.S .), [1977]1 S.C.R . 112, at p. 120; see
also Reference re Quebec Magistrate's Court, [1965] S .C .R . 772; Dupont v. Inglis,
[1958] S.C .R . 535 ; Brooks v. Pavlick, [1964] S.C .R . 108; Tremblay v. Commission
des relations de travail du Québec, [1967] S .C .R . 697; Jones v. Edmonton School
Trustees, [1977] 2 S .C.R . 873;Mississauga v. Peel, supra, footnote 20 . This pattern
of judicial restraint in support of provincial power had been established by the Privy
Council in Labour RelationsBd . (Sask.)v.JohnEastlronWorks, [19491A .C . 134 .
sa Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C .R . 299.
70

[19571 S.C.R . 285 .

'1 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C .R . 100.

72
[197812 S.C .R . 662.
°a [197812 S.C .R . 770.
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assembly for the democratic process . Whatever else one may say
about the recent decisions, they are certainly favourable to provincial
power.
8 . Paratrtountcy .
The B .N .A . Act says nothing explicit about conflict between
federal and provincial laws. The Privy Council early developed the
rule of federal paramountcy : in the event of conflict the federal law
was to prevail . Surprisingly, however, there were only a few
occasions for the application of this rule by the Privy Council, and
their lordships never developed any jurisprudence as to the degree of
inconsistency which would amount to a conflict which would attract
the rule. Here then was an opportunity for the court to give effect to
any centralizing predispositions . Given the overriding force of
federal law, a wide definition of inconsistency would result in the
defeat of provincial laws in the same "field" as a federal law. In the
United States and Australia there are many precedents for this
covering-the-field test of conflict. On the other hand, a narrow
definition of inconsistency would allow provincial laws to survive so
long as they did not expressly contradict the federal law .'
The Supreme Court of Canada has not followed the coveringthe-field precedents of the United States and Australia . It has not
taken the course of judicial activism in favour of central power . On
the contrary, it has insisted upon a direct contradiction between the
federal and provincial law to trigger the paramountcy doctrine.
There are many cases in which the court has refused to render a
provincial law inoperative for paramountcy '75 and only two where
the conflict was deemed sufficient to render the provincial law
inoperative .7s The cases have been described elsewhere," but it is
perhaps worth briefly describing one case. In Ross v. Registrar of
Motor Vehicles (1973),'8 the court was concerned with the effect of a
federal Criminal Code provision dealing with penalties for drunk
driving and conferring a discretion on the sentencing court to
prohibit driving on an intermittent basis- -at such times and places
"

For general discussion, see Peter W. Hogg, op . cit., footnote 21, ch . 6.

Te

Supra, footnote 75 .

Ts

The leading cases are Reference re s. 92(4) of the Vehicles Act 1957 (Sask.),
[1958] S .C .R . 608; Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S .C .R . 776; O'Grady v. Sparling,
[1960] S.C .R . 804; Stephens v. The Queen, [1960] S .C.R . 823; Mann v. The Queen,
[1966] S .C .R . 238; Ross v . Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1 S .C .R . 5; Bell v.
A.-G. P.E.I ., [1975] 1 S .C .R . 25 ; Robinson v. Countrywide Factors, [1978] 1
S.C .R . 753; Construction Montcalm v. Commission du salaire minimum, supra,
footnote 20 .
's A.-G. B.C. v. Smith, [1967] S.C .R . 702; A.-G. Ont. v. Policy-holders of
Wentworth Insurance Co ., [1969] S .C .R . 779.
" Op . cit., footnote 21, ch . 6.
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as may be specified in the order" . In the Ross case this power had
been exercised by prohibiting the defendant "from driving for a
period of six months, except Monday to Friday, 9:00 a.m . to 5 :45
p .m ., in the course of employment and going to and from work" .
The question was whether the Criminal Code discretion, as
exemplified by the Ross order, conflicted with a provincial law
which automatically suspended the driving licence_ of anyone
convicted of drunk driving. The provincal law had the effect of
nullifying the spirit if .not the letter of the carefully tailored order
made under the Criminal Code because the order obviously
contemplated that the defendant be free to drive in the periods which
were exempt from the prohibition . Yet the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the provincial law was not rendered inoperative by
paramountcy. Ross's licence was suspended.
While the Ross case is the most extreme example, many others
could be cited to show the length to which the court has been willing
to, go in support Of provincial laws ." In this area the Supreme Court
of Canada has developed doctrine highly favourable to provincial
power.

9. Conclusion .
My conclusion is that the Supreme Court of Canada has
generally adhered to the doctrine laid down by the Privy Council
precedents ; and that where the court has departed from those
precedents, or has been without close precedents, the choices
between competing lines of reasoning have favoured the provincial
interest at least as often as they have favoured the federal interest .
There is no basis for the claim that the court has been biased in
favour of the federal interest in constitutional litigation .

's Supra, footnote 74, but see especially the decisions in Reference re s . 92(4)
of the Vehicles Act 1957 (Sask), Smith v. The Queen and Mann v. The Queen, supra,

footnote 75 .

